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LIVING NEXT TO THE UNITED
STATES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
CANADIAN GuN CONTROL POLICY,
POLITICS, AND LAW
Christopher D. Ram* **
I. INTRODUCTION
Canada and the United States differ greatly in attitudes and approaches
to the role firearms and other weapons play, or should play, in our
respective societies. The juxtaposition of two very different policies, their
controversial nature, and the close social and geographical proximity of
Canada and the United States inevitably lead to comparisons between the
two. Correlations between policies, legislation and statistics in one or
both countries fuel arguments from interest groups who compare American
oranges with Canadian apples and often mistake correlation for causation.
Arguments comparing Canada and the United States or various
regions within them almost always over-simplify the factors involved,
usually in the interest of scoring debating points for one side or the other.
The available evidence suggests that there is a general relationship between
our respective policies and laws regarding firearms, the actual rates of
ownership or availability of firearms in society, rates of crime, and of
homicidal, suicidal and accidental shooting incidents.' It seems relatively
* The author is employed as legal counsel for the Canadian federal Justice
Department and assisted with the development of legislation, regulations and related policy
matters in the subject area of firearms and other offensive weapons between 1990-94.
Except where specifically noted otherwise, the content of this paper reflects the views and
personal observations of the author during that period and does not represent the position
of the Government of Canada or any minister, department or agency thereof.
** At the time this paper was written (January 1995), amendments to Canada's gun
control legislation, Part III of the Criminal Code, were being prepared. Information
concerningfuture amendments, proposedfor 1995, is basedonTHE GovENMENT's ACTION
PLAN ON FiREARMS CONTROL and other documents released by the Minister of Justice on
November 30, 1994. At that time, the Minister indicated that the proposed amendments,
which were being drafted, would be introduced in the House of Commons sometime in
February of 1995. The legislation was introduced by the Minister of Justice on February
14, 1995 and is presently before the Canadian House of Commons as Bill C-68.
1. See Martin L. Friedland, Gun Control in Canada: Politics and Impact, in
PERSPECTIVES IN CRIMINAL LAW 226,226-29 (Anthony N. Doob & Edward L. Greenspan
279
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
clear that Canada enjoys lower rates in all of these areas as well as stricter
firearm controls, more conservative attitudes towards firearm acquisition
and ownership.2 Similar observations have been made in comparisons
with other countries, notably Great Britain.3
It seems equally clear that these phenomena are connected, and that
some very general policy conclusions can be safely drawn from comparing
Canada and the United States. More specific conclusions are much more
problematical, however. The complex relationship and large number of
related factors make the drawing of specific conclusions risky, if not
outright misleading. They also ignore the fact that what goes on in one
country affects what goes on in the other. A clear reaction to the impact
(real or perceived) of firearms on U.S. society can be seen in the positions
taken by successive Canadian governments, and to some degree in
Canadian public opinion as well. The reciprocal impact is probably less
pronounced since the U.S. is much bigger than Canada, but it should not
be overlooked.
Canada's legislation and policies reflect the attitudes of Canadians and
their elected officials over time, but it would be an oversimplification to
suggest that the legislation was wholly a product of public opinion. The
relationship is more in the nature of two separate phenomena, each
producing a reciprocal effect on the other. The development of each side
of this duet is in turn influenced by external factors such as general
political pressures, the media, public opinion or specific reactions to the
occurrence of shooting incidents or other newsworthy events involving
crime or firearms. One such factor, clearly seen in Canada, is the
political and social controversy over firearms in the United States.
This Article will examine the constitutional basis, historical
development, and administration of Canada's gun control legislation as an
expression of Canadian beliefs and culture in comparison and contrast to
eds., 1985); Martin Killias, International Correlations Between Gun Ownership and Rates
of Homicides and Suicide, 148 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1721, 1721-25 (1993); John H. Sloan
et al., Handgun Regulations, Crime, Assault and Homicides: A Tale of Two Cities, 319
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1256 (1988); Catherine F. Sproule & Deborah J. Kennett, Killing with
Guns in the U.S.A. and Canada 1977-1983: Further Evidence for the Effectiveness of Gun
Control, 31 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 245 (1989).
2. Canada does not presently register firearms, and the exact number or ownership rate
is not known. In its 1994 policy announcement, the government indicates that there are
1.2 million (registered) restricted firearms, and between 6 and 7 million other firearms
owned by about 3 million Canadians. Firearms interest groups have suggested far greater
numbers exist. See COMMUmCATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS BRANCH, CAN. DEP'T JUSTICE, THE
GOVERNMENT'S ACTION PLAN ON FIREARMS CONTROL 14 (1994) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN].
3. See, e.g., Firing Up, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1994, at 69.
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those prevalent in the United States. In some cases, those beliefs and
cultural factors will be seen to have been influenced by developments in
American law and society and the way in which those elements are
perceived by Canadians and their governments. Particular emphasis will
be placed on relatively recent changes to the legislation, enacted during
1976 and 1977 and late 1991, and to further changes being proposed by
the present Government for 1995.
H. HISTORY OF CANADIAN GuN CONTROL LEGISLATION
Understanding the different approaches of Canada and the United
States to gun control requires an understanding of the historical differences
between the two countries. One Canadian author stated that
Both countries came into existence as a result of the American
Revolution. But whereas the United States was founded as a
result of the defiance of authority, Canada was the result of
obedience to the Crown.4
American attitudes to firearm ownership, particularly for the purposes
of civil defence and self-protection, have been shaped by history, both
directly as a result of the impact of the Second Amendment's "right to
bear arms," and indirectly by the role played by firearms in American
society. It has been suggested that the right to bear arms reflects the
views of "an intense minority with a cultural heritage derived from
historical conditions now passed," which are not shared by a majority of
the American people.5  A significant part of the National Rifle
Association's [NRA] support probably has less to do with cultural or
historical beliefs than the very real fear of crime and the resulting demand
for access to firearms.
6
There seems little doubt, however, that the influence exerted by the
NRA and similar groups in the United States is far greater than any which
can be attributed to Canadian organizations. As noted below, there is no
constitutional or legislative guarantee or protection of the right to obtain,
possess, or own firearms in Canada, and access to firearms has been
4. Friedland, supra note 1, at 242-43.
5. Steven T. Seitz, Guns, Politics and Public Policy, in STRUCTuRE, LAW AND PoWER 83,
103 (Paul J. Brantingham & Jack M. Kress eds., 1979).
6. Home on the Range: Guns and Freedom, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1994, at 23-25;
Land of the Free, ECONOMIST, Mar, 26, 1994, at 15-16.
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limited by legislation since the previous century. Where the American
approach is characterized by the Second Amendment, the overall approach
of Canadian governments has been to restrict access to firearms in any
circumstances for which no demonstrated social need for access could be
shown. Such restrictions have at times proven controversial, but have by
and large enjoyed the support of the Canadian public, and have generally
been upheld by the courts when challenged.
Restrictions take several forms. The most fundamental form, the
punishment and deterrence of offenses committed using firearms, is
common to the United States and most other countries. Related to this are
measures intended to incapacitate those who are believed likely to misuse
firearms, usually based either on a history of such offenses, or on
characteristics such as mental illness, young age, or substance abuse.7
Incapacitation commonly involves the incarceration of convicted offenders
for long periods to prevent re-offending, but can also include more
specific measures such as laws denying convicted felons licenses to obtain
or possess firearms. These too, are common to the United States and
Canada, although the Canadian legislation goes further, allowing (and in
serious cases, compelling) courts to make specific orders barring the
possession of firearms.'
Canadian and American legislation have historically differed with
respect to more proactive measures, including various requirements for
licensing, screening prior to acquisition or possession, controls on use, and
restrictions or complete prohibitions on particular types of firearm. These
policies, all well-established in Canadian law, are regarded as highly
controversial in the United States. As will be seen, the differences may
be found, not only in the drafting of legislation and regulations, but with
respect to their administration as well. Many Canadians share the view
that American gun control laws are -drafted more for their political
symbolism than any intention to actually reduce access to firearms, and
that their effectiveness is further reduced by conflicting state jurisdictions
and a general lack of will on the part of officials confronted with what
must often seem to be an impossible task.9
7. Criminal Code, R.S.C, ch. 40, §§ 93-94 (1991) (Can.) (offenses of transfer to
minors, persons impaired or of unsound mind), and § 100 (proactive and reactive court
prohibition orders).
8. Id. § 100.
9. See, e.g., Special Committee on the Subject-Matter of Bill C-80 (Firearms), Minutes
of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on the Subject-Matter of Bill C-80
(Firearms) at 3: 93-94 (13 Dec. 1990) [hereinafter Special Committee on Bill C-80]. A
commonly cited example is the fact that U.S. legislation barring the transfer of firearms
[Vol. 15
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A. Legislation Prior to 1976
Controls on the carriage and transfer of firearms and other weapons
existed in Canadian law prior to the first codification of the criminal law
in 1892, at which time they were added to the Criminal Code. 10 Permits
to carry firearms under certain circumstances became a requirement for
handguns in 1913,11 and for all firearms in 1920, although this was
repealed in 1921.12 The 1919 amendments also distinguished between
aliens and British subjects with respect to access to firearms, possibly as
a result of concerns about left-wing subversion in the wake of the 1917
Bolshevik revolution and/or veterans returning from World War J.13 Even
at this stage, media reports about the perceived threat of visiting
"foreigners, especially the Americans, who habitually carried weapons"
appear to have had an influence on Canadian policies.' 4
Another issue involving the United States which emerged at an early
stage was the question of how to deal with visiting American hunters who,
not surprisingly, wished to bring their firearms into Canada when coming
here to hunt or to pass through Canada between the southern United States
and Alaska. This problem, which sets the difficulty of screening and
licensing visitors with firearms against the economic value of tourism,
to felons or underage recipients applies only to dealers, allowing "straw-man" purchases
whereby firearms may be lawfully bought from a dealer and then transferred to a third
party who could not lawfully have purchased it directly. Canadian transfer restrictions
apply to private transactions (including loans, gifts, inheritance etc.), as well as
commercial transactions. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 97 (1991) (Can.).
10. Description of the Development of the Substantive Portion of the Criminal Code
1892-1955 (Working Document) by Yvon Dandurand (Chief Criminologist, Evaluation and
Statistics, Department of Justice, Canada, 1982) at 187-258. For further information
about the history of Canada's gun control legislation, see Friedland, supra note 1; Special
Committee on Bill C-80, supra note 9, at 1:16-18 (5 Dec. 1990) (evidence of Richard G.
Mosely).
11. Criminal Code, S.C., ch. 13, § 4 (1913) (Can.), amended by S.C. 1919, c. 25,
cited in Dandurand, supra note 10, at 199-201.
12. Criminal Code, S.C., ch. 43, § 2 (1920) (Can.), cited in Dandurand, supra note
10, at 201 and S.C., ch. 25, § 2(1) (1921) (Can.) repealing 118(1)(aa) and replacing it
with 118(1)(dl). See also Martin L. Friedland, Gun Control: The Options, 18 CluM.
L. Q. 29, 43 (1975).
13. See Dandurand, supra note 10, at 210-11. In 1919, labour unrest in Canada
culminated in the Winnipeg General Strike and the shooting of several protestors by
police. Id.
14. See Senate Debates (1921) at 392, cited in Dandurand, supra note 10, at 221-22.
1995]
284 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 15
resulted in amendments to a screening requirement enacted in 1932-33, "
and continues to be a difficult issue for the Canadian government.
16
B. 1976-77 Amendments (S.C. 1976-77c.53)
In 1976, the Criminal Code was amended to create a system, still in
effect, under which the acquisition (but not ongoing possession) of all
firearms was made subject to licensing. 7 The effect, when combined with
previous legislation, was that a permit, known as the "Firearms
Acquisition Certificate" [FAC] was needed to acquire any firearm. If that
firearm was also a "restricted weapon" under the statute, it had to be
individually registered with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]
and ongoing possession required a license as well. 18  The private or
commercial transfer of any firearm in any manner to a recipient without
a Certificate was made an offence. 9 As it applied only to acquisition, the
new scheme was prospective only: those who already had firearms when
the change took effect and did not wish to acquire more did not need to
obtain an FAC.
15. See Senate Debates (1932-33) at 424, cited in Dandurand, supra note 10, at 231-
32.
16. See Dandurand, supra note 10; Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 97(4)(c) (1991)
(Can.). Testimony before a 1990 Parliamentary Committee hearing indicated that the
business of guiding non-resident hunters in the province of British Columbia began before
1900, and in 1989, involved 265 licensed businesses generating annual revenues of about
$26 million (Can.). About 70% of visiting hunters were from the United States.
Concerns expressed included not only the direct impact of some of the proposed
restrictions on visiting hunters, but also the indirect impact should they bemisrepresented
or misunderstood in the United States. See Special Committee on Bill C-80, supra note
9, at 10:47-58 (15 Jan. 1991).
17. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 53 (1976-77) (Can.).
18. All handguns, short-barrelled centrefire semiautomatic rifles, and shotguns and
firearms manufactured shorter than 470mm (18.5") are restricted weapons. Firearms
reduced in length after manufacture (i.e., "sawed-off" rifles or shotguns) are prohibited
completely. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 53, § 84(1) (1976-77) (Can.). At the present
day, according to the R.C.M.P., slightly more than 95% of the restricted weapons
registered in Canada are handguns. See generally RCMP Firearms Registration and
Administration Section.
19. Id. § 97. Exceptions are provided for transfers to business permit holders, for the
use of a firearm under the supervision of its owner, and other circumstances. The
offenses apply to both transferor and recipient, and to any form of acquisition, including,
gifts, loans, inheritances, and imports. Id. Non-residents may temporarily import without
a Certificate. Id.
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The long-term policy of focusing additional controls on specific types
of firearm was continued in the 1976-77 amendments which prohibited
firearms "capable of discharging bullets in rapid succession during one
pressure of the trigger ... ."20 This amendment is also significant
because it set a precedent for the "grandfathering" of the property interests
of owners who obtained automatic firearms before they were prohibited.
This was done by making automatic firearms registered by the cut-off date
of January i, 1978 "restricted weapons" and all others within the
automatic firearm class definition "prohibited weapons." 21  Since the
import, transfer or possession of a prohibited weapon is an offence, all
unregistered weapons became illegal, and future imports were banned as
of the effective date. The amendment also limited future registrations of
these firearms to those who were "bonafide gun collectors" who already
had one or more such firearms in a collection. The amendment effectively
created a closed class of owners. It ensured that the "grandfathered"
firearms would eventually be forced out of circulation as the number of
eligible collectors was diminished by deaths or the disposal of gun
collections.'
Provisions allowing courts to prohibit specific individuals from
possessing firearms were also expanded in the 1976-77 amendments.
Prohibition orders, previously limited to those convicted of firearm-related
offenses, were expanded to include any offence which involved the use,
threat or attempt of violence, and to cases where some danger to safety
was established, but no criminal offence was committed or even alleged.
Previously, the use of prohibition orders could be seen as a form of
punishment, albeit one with a strong component of incapacitation. But,
the new purely proactive orders could only be justified as a means of
incapacitating potential offenders or suicides. As with reactive orders, the
new orders required a court hearing, although not to the same procedural
standards as a full criminal trial.23  In emergencies, firearms could be
seized without a warrant and taken before a court as part of the prohibition
process. 24
20. Id. § 3(c). of the definition of "prohibited weapon" in what was then § 82(1) of
the Criminal Code. The amended text of this provision appears as the same paragraph of
§ 84(1). See also para. (c) of the definition of "restricted weapon" in the same provision.
21. Id. § 84(1)(c) of the definition of "prohibited weapon" and § 84(1)(c) of the
definition of "restricted weapon."
22. Id. § 109(4).
23. Id. § 100(4)-(11).
24. Id. § 103(2).
1995] 285
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It has been suggested that the proactive prohibition powers are under-
used by police and the courts. During the debate of the 1991 Criminal
Code amendments, the Hon. Kim Campbell, then Minister of Justice,
stated that
Under the present law police may also make an application [for
a prohibition order] to a court where they have reasonable
grounds to believe that allowing a person to keep a firearm or
acquisition certificate would endanger the safety of any person.
This provision is an important one for domestic violence
situations and. will be kept unchanged. I will be asking my
provincial counterparts to encourage police officers across
Canada to use it wherever possible to remove firearms from
dangerous situations before they can cause harm.25
Statistics published by the R.C.M.P. indicate that reactive prohibition
orders far outnumber proactive ones. 26 A 1992 study commissioned by the
Canadian Justice Department recommended that police training should
place greater emphasis on the use of proactive seizures and prohibitions,
especially in the context of domestic violence cases, where police officers
are often confronted by repeated calls to the same residence.
2 7
25. House of Commons Debates (6 June 1991) at 1251. The setting of police and
prosecutorial policies in Canada is a matter for provincial, not federal ministers, except
for the Yukon and Northwest Territories.
26. In 1993, the R.C.M.P. reported far higher levels of prohibition resulting from
other court actions than those initiated directly by police officers. A total of 8150
mandatory and 2480 discretionary prohibitions resulted from criminal sentences, 49
prohibitions resulted from the refusal of an FAC, and 208 resulted from seizure and
prohibition proceedings originated by the police. See Annual Firearms Report to the
Solicitor General of Canada by the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
1993. A similar pattern may be found in the numbers given for other years in the late
1980s and early 1990s. The total number of firearms and owners in Canada is not known,
but is believed to be between 6 and 7 million firearms in the hands of about 2.5 to 3
million individuals, based on a 1991 survey commissioned by the federal Justice
Department and carried out by the Angus Reid survey group.
27. Police Responses to Domestic Violence: A Study of the Use of Criminal Code
Provisions Relating to Firearms (Working Document) by Colin Meredith & Chantal
Paquette (Canada Department of Justice, June 1991).
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C. The 1991 Amendments (S. C. 1991 c. 40)
On the evening of December 6, 1989, a man armed with a centrefire
semiautomatic rifle and several 30-shot cartridge magazines entered the
University of Montreal's engineering school and shot 28 persons, 14
fatally, before turning the gun on himself. This incident galvanized
Canadian public opinion, ultimately resulting in the formation of several
lobby groups and the signing of a petition calling for the prohibition of
"military or para-military firearms" by over 600,000 Canadians. 2  This
was a far stronger reaction than was felt in the wake of earlier, similar
incidents in Stockton and San Ysidro, California, and Hungerford,
England, and served as a reminder that Canada was not immune to what
had hitherto been seen as a strictly American phenomenon. Similar
reactions had occurred in England (and to a lesser extent in Canada) after
the Hungerford shooting incident.
The reaction to the Montreal shooting incident was further magnified
by the fact that the killer was motivated by anti-feminism, and that all of
the 14 deceased were women.29 One reporter who covered the shootings
stated that
[T]hat's the moment in the whole thing that I remember the
most, because that's when the impact of it all really hit you.
And the fact that it was all women [the victims] hit right then,
too. It wasn't delayed. It didn't take awhile to sort out what had
happened... because you knew that most of the people in there
[the engineering school] were men. So if most of the dead were
women, there was obviously something different going on here.30
28. The Minister of Justice met with the students of the University in the fall of 1990,
at which time the petition had over 500,000 signatures. See House of Commons Debates
(22 Nov. 1990) at 15,572. The petition was not actually tabled in Parliament until some
months later, by which time the number of signatures had passed 600,000. This amounted
to a strong statement from Canadians, comparable to about 6 million signatures in the
United States. Families and friends of victims also played a major role in setting up
organizations and lobbying for stricter legislation. See Bill Trent, The Medical Profession
Sets Its Sights on the Gun Control Issue, 145 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1332; Daphney
Bramham, Both Sides Praise New Gun Control Bill (Victim's Mother Says She Feels
Betrayed), MoNTREAL GAZEXrm, May 31, 1991, at Al; Marie-Cloade Lortie, L'arme utilis~e
par Marc Lepine n 'est toujours pas interdite par la nouvelle loi [Weapon Used by Marc
Lepine Still Not Outlawed by New Law], LA PRESSE, May 31, 1991 at Al.
29. Several survivors indicated that he shouted (in French), "I hate feminists" during
the shooting incident.
30. Man Alive (Canadian Broadcasting Corp. broadcast, Nov. 27, 1990).
1995] 287
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
This fact provoked a continuing debate about whether it should be
seen as an isolated incident or a manifestation of a more pervasive social
misogyny, and served to draw groups concerned about violence against
women into the gun control debate. Many would probably have gotten
involved even without this stimulus. Firearms in the home have been
repeatedly cited as a problem in the context of domestic violence, both by
victims and the police. But, the impact of the Montreal shootings
probably brought them into the debate sooner and to a far greater extent
than would otherwise have been the case.
In 1991, major changes were made to the legislation, although the
basic framework combining deterrence, incapacitation, screening and
firearm-specific controls was not altered.31 The Government had first
introduced legislation on June 26, 1990, immediately prior to the recess
of Parliament for the summer. The legislation and general subject of gun
control were the subject of hearings by a Special Committee of the House
of Commons the following winter.32 However, the legislation did not
receive Third Reading. It died with the end of the Parliamentary session
in early May of 1991, but was immediately revised and re-introduced at
the beginning of the following session, at the end of the same month.33
It was the subject of legislative committee hearings the following fall, and
was passed and given Royal Assent on December 6, 1991, the second
anniversary of the 1989 mass shooting incident.
The Firearms Acquisition Certificate requirements were enhanced, but
still limited to those who sought to acquire firearms, not to ongoing
possession. The minimum age for applicants was raised from 16 years to
18 years, and a mandatory minimum 28-day waiting period between
application and issuance was imposed. In addition, applicants were
required to provide the names of two personal references, and answer an
expanded application questionnaire.34 A major focus of the legislation was
31. House of Commons Debates (22 Nov. 1990) at 15,572-78 (statement by Hon. Kim
Campbell, Minister of Justice). The Minister referred to the three major policies of
Canadian gun control as the screening of gun owners, controls on specific types or classes
of firearms (those classed as prohibited or restricted weapons), and measures intended to
deter firearm-related crime. Id.
32. House of Commons Debates (26 June 1990) at 13,089 (introduction of legislation
numbered as Bill C-80), and 15,566-85 (reference to Special Committee).
33. House of Commons Debates (30 May 1991) at 783 (legislation re-introduced and
numbered as Bill C-17).
34. Although part of the government's 1991 gun control package, the expanded
questionnaire was actually implemented with the prescription of new application forms by
the R.C.M.P. Commissioner under the authority of the statute, on January 1, 1993.
288 [Vol. 15
CANADIAN GUN CONTROL
the imposition of further firearm-specific controls directed at limiting
firepower. These took the form of three elements: prohibiting converted
automatic firearms; designating a number of "military or paramilitary"
firearms as either prohibited or restricted weapons; and imposing cartridge
magazine capacity limits on magazines for centrefire semiautomatic
firearms and all handguns. The reasons given for imposing additional
controls included both the proliferation of "military and para-military"
firearms in Canada in the twelve years since the previous amendments,
and the use of a high firepower weapon in the Montreal mass shooting
incident.35
As had been the case in the United States and elsewhere, the
prohibition of automatic firearms led to the mechanical conversion of
firearms to avoid the legislation, ranging from merely cosmetic changes
to legitimate attempts to collect former machineguns without breaking the
law. During the late 1980s and early 90s, police pressure and conflicting
case law about acceptable conversion standards led the Government to act
to prohibit converted automatic firearms as well. 36 The 1991 amendments
expanded the definition of "prohibited weapon" to expressly include every
firearm capable of automatic fire "whether or not it has been altered to
fire only one projectile with one [trigger] pressure . . . .", Following the
precedent of the 1976-77 amendments, those who had such firearms were
allowed to retain them, provided that registration proceedings were
commenced or completed by January 1, 1992.38 The 1991 amendments
also contained provisions that made producing automatic firearms or
35. House of Commons Debates (22 Nov. 1990) at 15,575-77 (statement of Hon. Kim
Campbell, Minister of Justice). The firearm involved, Sturm Roger's "Mini-14," was not
prohibited by the changes however, a fact for which the Government was criticised in the
media. See Lortie, supra note 28, at Al.
36. See R. v. Covin and Covin, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 725, 8 C.C.C. (3d) 240 (status of
"firearm"); R. v. Global Armaments Ltd. (1990), 105 A.R. 260 (status of automatic
firearm as prohibited weapon retained unless conversion "essentially irreversible"); R. v.
Hasselwander, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 398, 81 C.C.C. (3d.) 471, rev'g (1991) 67 C.C.C. (3d)
426, 5 O.R. (3d) 225 (C.A.) (holding that prohibited status was retained if reconversion
was possible in a relatively short period of time with relative). For Great Britain, see R.
v. Clarke, [1986] 1 All E.R. 846; 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed.), para. 221;
0. SANDYS-WINCH, GUN LAW (5th ed.) (1990).
37. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 84(1) (1991) (Can.) definition of "prohibited
weapon", para. (c).
38. Id. § 84(1) definition of "prohibited weapon," para. (c), definition of "restricted
weapon," para. (c. 1), and § 109(4.1)-(4.3).
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converting existing firearms to be capable of fully-automatic fire specific
offenses. 3
The amendments did not directly affect the status of military firearms
or cartridge magazines. The former were designated as either "prohibited
weapons" or "restricted weapons" by Orders in Council under delegated
legislative powers which were already in the Criminal Code. The effect
of "pyohibited weapon" status was to impose a complete ban on imkort,
export and domestic possession or transfer, 4° although the owners of some
specific firearm types were allowed to keep them under a legislative
"grandfather clause" exemption.4'
The capacity of cartridge magazines was limited by regulations made
under an amendment to the definition of "prohibited weapon" so defining
any "large-capacity cartridge magazine" of a type prescribed by
regulation. 42  This imposed limits on the firepower of the designated
firearms by prohibiting the possession of magazines for those firearms if
they exceeded the prescribed capacities. The limits, set at 10 shots for
handguns and 5 shots for centrefire semiautomatic rifles and shotguns,
were the subject of strong, but unsuccessful opposition from firearm
owners and businesses.43
A major focus of gun control opponents was the legislation's lack of
emphasis on sentencing and deterrence provisions. Essentially, the
argument made was a variation on the popular American argument that
"guns don't kill people, people kill people . . . ." If the existing
legislation did not control gun crime, it was argued, the appropriate
response was to focus on measures that would deter offenders, rather than
affect the interests of all firearm owners as a general class. 4' This
argument was also heard frequently during the legislative debates.
It seems to me that this bill as it now reads is dealing not with
the fundamental issue of controlling the criminal use of guns. It
is penalizing people who have proven in the past that they are
39. Id. § 95.1.
40. See Prohibited Weapons Orders No. 9-12, SOR/92-463, 92-464, 92-465, and 92-
466; Restricted Weapons Order, SOR/92-467.
41. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 84(1.2) (1991) (Can.).
42. Id. § 84(1) definitioia of "restricted weapon," para. (f); Cartridge Magazine
Control Regulations, SOR/92-460.
43. Ontario Handgun Association v. Attorney General of Ontario (30 June 1993), (Ont.
Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
44. Gun Control Proposals Draw Mixed Reactions, TORONTO STAR, May 31, 1991, at
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part of the solution and not part of the problem of gun-related
deaths in Canada. Does this Bill deal with increased penalties for
criminals who use guns in the course of a crime? . . . . . [Ilt was
suggested by many of the lobbyists who appeared before the
committee that we should increase the penalties for the use of
guns in crime. I
The first draft of the legislation, Bill C-80, contained relatively few
changes to deterrence provisions, but several were added before it was re-
introduced as Bill C-17.46 The changes included longer maximum
sentence provisions for the offenses of possessing a prohibited weapon,
possession of any firearm while prohibited by a court order, and importing
or trafficking in prohibited weapons. The length of mandatory court
prohibition orders was also doubled, from five to ten years. The provision
to which the Honourable Kim Campbell referred was not amended,
however. Section 85 of the Criminal Code provides for mandatory
sentences of one to fourteen years, where an accused is convicted of
having used a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence. This
had been criticised as insufficient for failing to set higher minimum terms
and for allowing prosecutors to "plea-bargain" charges away in exchange
for guilty pleas on the underlying offence charges.47
I. ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTION IN CANADIAN
GuN CONTROL LAW
Canadian constitutional law dealing with firearms and other offensive
weapons differs from that of the United States in two critical aspects. In
the United States, the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
protects, to some degree, the ownership of firearms." Much of the
45. House of Commons Debates (5 Nov. 1991) at 4589 (statement of J. Peterson,
Member for Willowdale).
46. House of Commons Debates (6 June 1991) at 1250-51 (statement of Hon. Kim
Campbell, Minister of Justice).
47. The application of § 85 is further complicated by the fact that prosecutors and
prosecutorial discretion in Canada are under the authority of provincial, not federal
governments. At least two federal justice ministers have publicly urged provinces to
impose guidelines limiting plea bargains, however, and several have responded.
48. The question of whether or not the right to bear arms actually extends beyond the
militia function to which the Second Amendment refers will not be discussed in this paper.
The acceptance of the right as more or less unlimited by its proponents and its repeated
use in opposing gun control legislation put its effect on U.S. policy beyond question,
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authority to make legislation respecting firearms is vested in the state
governments, although there may be a tendency towards federal legislation
in the field since the enactment of the Gun Control Act of 1968. 49 In
Canada, on the other hand, the ownership or possession of firearms is not,
except in the most indirect sense, the subject of any constitutional or extra-
legislative protection. Canada's legislation, which is found in Part III of
the Canadian Criminal Code, is within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction
of the federal government. However, much of its administration is
delegated to provincial or local police officials.
A. The Right to Bear Arms and Property Rights
The "right to bear arms" of the Second Amendment and U.S.
jurisprudence seldom arises in Canadian courts," although some lower-
court challenges have discussed the application of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms to recent legislative changes. The Charter, enacted
in 1982,51 guarantees many fundamental rights and freedoms similar to
those found in the American Bill of Rights, but in more modern, less
absolute terms.52 In drafting the provisions, the government had access to
the Bill of Rights and subsequent case law, and generally sought to avoid
what were seen as over-extension of many of the rights involved by U.S.
courts over the past 200 years. The right to bear arms was omitted
completely from the Charter.
In the 1993 case of R. v. Hasseiwander, the Supreme Court of
Canada expressly rejected the application of U.S. cases on the basis of the
constitutional distinctions between the two countries stating that
regardless of its exact interpretation by the courts. The Second Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution states, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of'a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."
49. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (as codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930
(1988)).
50. See, e.g., Re Scott (1979), 3 W.C.B. 181. A British Columbia provincial court
rejected an argument based on the infringement of the right to bear arms on the basis that,
in Canada, no such right exists. Id.
51. Constitution Act, Part 1, 1982.
52. The rule for excluding evidence which has been obtained illegally or improperly,
for example, can only be invoked where the accused shows that "having regard to all the
circumstances, its admission in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute." Id. § 24(2). All Charter rights are further limited by the power of the
government to make laws which infringe them, provided that this can be "demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." Id. § 1.
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The American authorities should not be considered in this case.
Canadians, unlike Americans, do not have the right to bear arms.
Indeed, most Canadians prefer the peace of mind and sense of
security derived from the knowledge that the possession of
automatic weapons is prohibited. s
It is possible, however, that where sufficiently pressing circumstances
exist, the ownership or possession of a firearm might raise some right
which goes beyond one of mere property, so as to raise Charter rights.
Significant numbers of Canadians rely on firearms to hunt for food, or for
indirect sustenance, most commonly in the context of fur-trapping. In
addition, access to firearms is a necessary condition for employment as a
police officer, member of the Canadian Forces, and in some cases
employment in the private security industry. Charter arguments have been
raised in such cases, most commonly on behalf of convicted persons who
have been prohibited by courts from possessing firearms, ammunition or
explosives as a result of a criminal conviction, 4 or who have been refused
5a Firearms Acquisition Certificate for similar reasons.
These challenges have enjoyed only limited success. Occupational
users such as soldiers have been almost completely unsuccessful. 56 A
stronger argument can be made on behalf of those such as sustenance
hunters or trappers, for whom no other means of income or sustenance is
generally available. A number of lower-court decisions have declined to
apply mandatory prohibitions in such cases on the basis that to do so
would offend the Charter ban on "cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment."57 A number of such decisions have been overturned on
appeal.58 The Supreme Court of Canada has upheld an Ontario Court of
53. R. v. Hasselwander (1993), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 471. The statement that there is no
right to bear arms in Canada must be regarded as obiter dicta, however, as the central
issue in the case was not the presence or absence of such a right, but whether Mr.
Hasselwander's firearm was "capable" of automatic fire and therefore a "prohibited
weapon" under the statute. Id.
54. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 100 (1991) (Can.).
55. Id. § 106.
56. R. v. Kenway (1990), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 414, 74 O.R. (2d) 629 (Ont. C.A.); cf. R.
v, Lusignan (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3d) 572 (N.S.C.A.). The court held that the 1991
amendments allowing for occupational exemptions applied to the accused, a member of
the Canadian Forces.
57. Charter of Rights, § 12. SeeR. v. Chief (1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 265 (Y.T.C.A.).
58. R. v. Tobac (1985), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 49 (N.W.T.C.A.) ; R. v. Smokeyday (1989),
6 W.W.R. 449 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Johnson (1993), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 21 (Y.T.C.A.).
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Appeal decision to the effect that, while the possibility of a Charter
exemption from mandatory sentencing provisions exists, mandatory
firearms prohibition order do not offend the Charter and were not
appropriate for the application of such exemptions.
59
The Criminal Code was amended in 1991 to allow the courts to opt
out of otherwise-mandatory prohibition orders in a case where a firearm
is needed for sustenance or the only available means of employment, and
would not raise any concerns about the safety of the offender or any other
person.' Further amendments allowing for greater flexibility in the
application of prohibition orders in such cases are presently under
consideration.
Less clear at present is the status of aboriginal rights based on treaty
or traditional hunting rights in Canada. Aboriginal rights enjoy some
degree of constitutional protection, and could conceivably raise a right to
possess firearms suitable for hunting, on the basis that the guaranteed right
could not otherwise be exercised. Traditional rights are increasingly being
raised, particularly following the 1992 holding of the Supreme Court that
section 12 of the Charter (cruel or unusual punishment) did not apply in
such cases. 6 Since the application of any such rights will vary according
to the facts of individual cases and the terms of each specific treaty raised,
it may be some time before any clear pattern in the case law emerges.
Aboriginal Canadians, who often live in remote situations where such
things as literacy (or facility with English or French) are less common and
the need for access to hunting firearms is greatest, pose a particular
problem for the government.62
59. R. v. Sawyer (1992), 78 C.C.C. (3d) 191.
60. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 100(1.1)-(1.3) (1991) (Can.).
61. R. v. Sawyer(1992), 78 C.C.C. (3d) 191. See R. v. Luke (1994), 87 C.C.C. (3d)
121 (Ont. C.A.). The court held § 12 to be unavailable based on Sawyer. The question
of whether the appellant's treaty rights might include the right to possess a firearm in
order to hunt was left open, however. While the treaty in question may have given a right
to hunt under certain circumstances, it contained a provision under which the parties
agreed to abide by the laws of Canada. Since the appellant had been convicted of an
offence, it was therefore not open to him to raise the treaty as a means of avoiding part
of the sentence for that offence. Id. Presumably, the same ruling will result whenever
a treaty with a similar term was involved, but would not apply where traditional rights or
issues such as the applicant's eligibility for an FAC (where no offence need be alleged)
were raised.
62. The legislation contains an exemption from application fees for those who hunt or
trap for sustenance purposes (Criminal Code § 106(12)), but aboriginal and sustenance
hunters are otherwise treated as any other applicants under the legislation. Efforts have
been made, however, to ease access where this can be done without compromising the
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The Charter of Rights also does not speak to the issue of general
property rights in the same way that the United States' Constitution does.
Section 8 of the Charter protects Canadians against unreasonable seizure,
but the courts have generally held that constitutionally protected interests
beyond those of mere property interests must be endangered in order to
invoke the constitutional protection. In the context of criminal law and
search or seizure, these interests most commonly involve privacy rights,
not property.
[T]he case law establishes clearly that not all "things" or
property are protected by s. 8 of the Charter. Rather, property
is protected under s. 8 only if the seizure of the property intrudes
into, or tramples on, the interests and values protected by s. 8.
The most important of the protected interests or values is privacy
in a law-enforcement context. In case after case, the Supreme
Court of Canada has stated that s. 8 protects the bodily integrity
and privacy of people, not their property, unless the property
being searched or seized relates directly to a privacy interest.63
The absence of a constitutionally protected right to property is, of
course, a matter which goes well beyond gun control in its scope. It is,
however, one which is supported by Canada's gun control opponents, and
has been raised by them in published editorials and other fora. In the fall
of 1991, when the Government of Canada raised the possibility of
amending the Charter to include property rights, firearms groups were
quick to recognize the potential impact on legislation restricting access to
firearms, at least insofar as it affected ownership interests .'r The proposed
constitutional amendment was never proceeded with. A number of the
1991 changes and subsequent Orders in Council adversely affected existing
property interests, either by restricting the right to transfer firearms, or by
screening standards. FAC references can include persons such as Band Councillor or
Elders, and safety course programs and examinations will eventually be offered in
aboriginal languages. See Firearms Acquisition Certificate Regulations, SOR/92-461.
63. R. v. Unishare Investments (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 603 at 608 (Ont. Ct.). See also
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417; R.
v. McKinlay Transport, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, R. v. Colaruso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20.
64. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Legislative Committee "H" on Bill C-1 7,
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and Customs Tariff in Consequence Thereof, at
No.3: 6, 18-19 (25 Sept. 1991) and No.5: 35-36 (1 Oct. 1991) [hereinafter Legislative
Committee H. ].
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prohibiting possession altogether.65 No successful challenges to these
changes have arisen based on property rights, although firearm owners
have had some success on other grounds.66
B. Roles of the Federal Government and the
Provinces in Canadian Gun Control
The second major difference between Canadian and American
approaches to gun control is that, while much of the American legislative
authority is vested in state legislatures, Canadian gun control legislation
is vested in the federal government as part of the government's exclusive
power to make criminal law,67 which includes laws intended to prevent
crime. 6' The provinces may also enact legislation involving firearms
where this is incidental to provincial powers under the Constitution Act,
1867,69 but these may not be inconsistent with the federal legislation, and
must have some valid purpose other than criminal law.
The federal legislation is enacted as Part III of the Criminal Code
(Firearms and Other Offensive Weapons). Also falling within the
legislative power are a number of delegated authorities, including the
making of regulations7" and Orders in Council, which are delegated to the
Governor-in-Council, a committee of the federal cabinet.7" The provisions
65. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., c. 40, § 2 (1991) (Can.) (definition of "weapon");
Cartridge Magazine Control Regulations, SOR/92-460; Prohibited Weapons Orders No.
9-12 SOR/92-463, 92-464, 92465, and 92-466; Restricted Weapons Order SOR/92-46;
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 109(4.1)-(4.3) (1991) (Can.).
66. Alberta v. Simmermon (1993), 146 A.R. 224 (Alta. Prov. Ct.), (appeal 12 Aug.
1994) (Alta. Q.B.) [unreported]. The court (Q.B.) held that an Order in Council declaring
the appellant's firearm to be a "prohibited weapon" was invalid on procedural grounds.
The provincial court rejected the applicant's constitutional arguments. The appeal, having
found for the applicant/appellant on procedural grounds, did not address them. Other
dicta concerning property rights have appeared in lower court decisions, but have yet to
be heard by appellate courts. See R. v. Rogan (1994), (Alta. Prov. Ct) [unreported].
67. Constitution Act, 1867 § 91(27).
68. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTrrUtlONAL LAW OF CANADA 133 (3d ed. 1992).
69. See, e.g., Ontario's recent Ammunition Control Act, S.O. 1994, c. 20.
Municipalities may also control the sale and discharge of firearms through local zoning
and licensing powers, and many large Canadian municipalities have by-laws prohibiting
the discharge of firearms within city limits.
70. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 116 (1991) (Can.).
71. Id. § 84(1), definitions of "prohibited weapon" ( (e)), and "restricted weapon"
( (d)). The Governor General in (Her Majesty's Privy) Council exercises the powers of
the sovereign in Canada. Most commonly, Orders of the Governor in Council are used
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include a number of licensing and other non criminal aspects, but these
have been consistently held intra vires of the federal Parliament as
incidental to an overall scheme which is criminal law in its nature.72
The exclusive federal legislative power avoids what is arguably one
of the critical weaknesses of American gun control legislation, that of
inconsistencies from one jurisdiction to the next, particularly with respect
to basic controls on firearm access and transfers." One distinguished
Canadian politician stated that
[I]t is laughable when you talk about one [American] state where
they have tough gun laws. It is very easy to go from one state
to another in the United States. Unless they have national laws,
the state laws mean nothing. You need a national system where
there are border controls . . . [T]o say that in New York State or
another state they have strict laws ... it means nothing.74
Attempting to legislate firearm controls in Canada on a province-by-
province basis would seriously weaken the existing system by creating the
potential for smuggling illegal firearms from provinces with weak controls
into those with strong ones, and by making it necessary to enact legislation
in eleven separate jurisdictions in order to give effect to any unitary
national policy initiatives. The existing national approach to the legislation
also provides less opportunity for regional special interest groups to
influence the political process, an important factor in Canada, where
public attitudes and pressures with respect to gun control vary along
urban-rural, north-south, and east-west lines.75
to bring legislation into force or to make regulations under legislative powers delegated
by statute. In practice, these powers are exercised by Special Committee of Council, all
members of whom are ministers in the cabinet of the government of the day. As in the
United States, ministers are appointed, but in Canada, with rare exceptions, ministers are
appointed only from the ranks of elected (and sitting) Members of Parliament.
72. See A. G. v. Pattison (1981), 21 C.R. (3d) 255, 59 C.C.C. (2d) 138 (Alta. C.A.);
R. v. Northcott (1980), 5 W.W.R. 38 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
73. See Friedland, supra note 1, at 240-46, citing Zimring, "Firearms and the Federal
Law: the Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STuD. 133, 191 (1975). See also Sproule
& Kennett, supra note 1.
74. Special Committee on Bill C-80, supra note 9, at 3:93 (13 Dec. 1990) (As a
minister in the government of Prime Minister Trudeau, Mr. Alimand was partly
responsible for the 1976-77 Criminal Code gun control amendments).
75. The exact nature of these differences has been a matter of controversy, but there
seems little doubt that they exist. Special Committee on Bill C-80, supra note 9, at 2:18-
19 (12 Dec. 1990), 4:44-45 and 4:70-71 (17 Dec. 1990) and 7:16-17 (19 Dec. 1990).
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Much of the firearms control system is actually carried out by
provincial and local agencies under the general law enforcement function
vested in the police, or under authorities to issue and revoke various
permits and licenses which are delegated directly to the provinces or
provincially-appointed officials.76 This provides some degree of flexibility
in the administration of the system to meet local or regional concerns, but
it has not generally interfered with the overall, Canada-wide application
of the legislation and regulations. The net effect operates to balance
federal, provincial, and local factors, and also provides a fairly cost-
effective means of operating the system by using existing police agencies
and resources already present in most Canadian communities.
In areas of provincial or local authority, a number of structural factors
have also operated to maintain national consistency, or failing that, at least
a viable balancing of interests. One such factor has been the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).77 The RCMP has the statutory
responsibility for registering restricted weapons, 78 and operates a national
unit to review applications and to maintain the registry system. The
authority to prescribe forms for applications, certificates and permits are
also delegated to the Commissioner of the RCMP. This is a strong
centralizing factor 79 because the same forms are used across Canada, and
applicants must complete them fully before any permit or certificate can
House of Commons Debates (22 Nov. 1990) at 15,574. See generally Albertans Must Bite
Bullet on Gun Law, CALGARY HERALD, May 31, 1991, at A3; 2 Sides Prepare for Intense
Fight Over Gun Bill, GLOBE & MAIL, June 1, 1991.
76. Note the definitions of "chief provincial firearms officer", "firearms officer" and
"local registrar of firearms" in Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 84(1) (1991) (Can.), as
well as the powers to issue Firearms Acquisition Certificates (§ 106), registration
certificates (§ 109), permits (§ 110), and the enforcement of business controls (§ 105).
Powers to regulate businesses are delegated to the federal government (§ 116(1)), but the
regulations include inspection and other regulatory powers for provincial officials.
Generally, the licensing of firearms businesses in Canada is administered exclusively by
the provinces under powers created by the federal statute and regulations.
77. Friedland, supra note 1, at 240-41.
78. Id.; Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, §§ 109, 114. For examples of "restricted
weapons," see supra note 18.
79. Following the 1991 amendments, new forms were developed jointly by the federal
Justice Department and the RCMP, following consultations and input from the provinces.
All three played a significant role in developing the forms, but since the same forms apply
across Canada, their impact in centralizing screening and registration procedures is the
same. Some local or provincial agencies have implemented regional policies by
demanding additional forms or information beyond what has been federally-prescribed.




be considered."0 Another influential aspect of the RCMP's involvement
in the administration of the legislation is its publication of a National
Firearms Manual, which contains resource materials and instructions for
local officers who process certificate and permit applications. This
document has no legal authority, but provides local officers, who often
have little training or specialization, with access to legal and procedural
support. In some provinces, the RCMP also provides municipal and rural
police services under a contractual arrangement between the provincial and
federal governments. 8' In these provinces, RCMP officers operate under
the ultimate control of provincial, not federal authority, but still tend to
rely on the federal force for training and advice when needed.
The federal government may also exert influence over provincial and
local administrative practices by virtue of the fact that the administration
of many of the statutory provisions is federally funded. The statute
provides for the making of federal-provincial financial agreements, 2 which
set up a contractual relationship under which to each province agrees to
administer specific aspects of the legislation and to collect user fees.
These fees are then paid back to the administering province. There are
some variations, but for the most part, the terms of these agreements have
been the same across Canada.
Even in areas where the legislation leaves matters to provincial or
local officials, the provinces or officials involved have often recognized
the problems inherent in regional approaches and sought uniformity with
respect to interpretation and application of the law. There have been
occasional differences of opinion with respect to forms and procedures,
but these have been relatively minor when compared with the overall
scope of the legislation. Quebec, for example, requires the completion of
additional forms or conditions for some permits, but still relies on the
federally-prescribed ones.
In the 1991 amendments, Parliament enacted a provision that allowed
provincial attorneys general to designate shooting competitions for which
participants could possess and use large-capacity cartridge magazines,
otherwise unavailable to competitors as "prohibited weapons." 3 The
80. Id. § 106(8) (firearms acquisition certificate), § 109(1) (restricted weapon
registration certificate), and § 110 (permits). See also id. § 113, concerning the offense
of making false or misleading statements, which applies to both the applicant and to his
or her personal references or others contacted by the firearms officer reviewing the
application.
81. RCMP Act, ch. 54, § 20 (1959) (Can.).
82. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, §§ 108, 111 (1991) (Can.).
83. Id. § 90(3.2).
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provinces subsequently decided not to designate any competitions under
this provision, thereby avoiding any inter-provincial inconsistencies. In
such cases, provinces are left to make their own policy decisions. Since
these are all made in more or less the same circumstances, and provincial
ministers are generally aware of one another's positions, however,
consistent decisions are likely unless specific political or situational
considerations dictate otherwise.
The 1976-77 amendments imposed a requirement" that all FAC
applicants take a course or test in-firearm safety. This requirement was
not put into effect until 199486 as part of a series of administrative changes
following the 1991 amendments. This provision requires the course or test
to be approved by the Attorney General of the province in which it was
taken, necessitating a province-by-province approach to implementation as
the necessary approvals were obtained. A substantial degree of national
consistency was obtained by the federal funding and development of the
program, in consultation with the various provincial authorities, as well as
some of the firearms interest groups from whom the instructors are
drawn."' The jointly developed Canadian Firearms Safety Course was the
only one approved by the provinces, until Quebec approved its own hunter
safety courses in late 1994. This weakened the consistency of the system
to some degree, and attracted media coverage accusing the government of
caving in to the interests of firearm owners immediately before a
provincial election.
88
Even where provincial autonomy is exercised in this way, the overall
impact is minimized by the large number of safeguards built into the
legislation. For example, while Quebec applicants may rely on approved
provincial courses, they must still meet the other requirements, including
84. Court challenges to the decisions were unsuccessful. See Ontario Handgun
Association v. A.G. (30 June 1993), (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported] (leave to appeal
denied by Ont. C.A.). Other unsuccessful challenges were launched against Saskatchewan
and the Attorney General of Canada (Northwest Territories).
85. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 106(2)(c) (1991) (Can.).
86. The requirement was proclaimed in force on a province-by-province basis pursuant
to Criminal Code subsection 106(3). It took effect in Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario,
Prince Edward Island, Quebec and the Yukon Territory on January 1, 1994, and in
Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia on April 1, 1994. By the end
of 1994 it was in effect in every part of Canada except for the Northwest Territories.
87. CANADIAN FIREARMS SAFETY COURSE: STUDENT'S HANDBOOK, (Can. Dep't of Justice),
(1993) (Acknowledgements).
88. Caving in on Gun Safety in Quebec, MONTREAL GAzETTE, August 26, 1994, at B2;
Peggy Curran, Dead Wrong: Province Shouldn't Tamper with Gun Control Legislation,
MONTREAL GAzETTE, Aug. 25, 1994, at B3.
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a twenty-eight day waiting period, the furnishing of two personal
references, a background and criminal record check, and completion of the
prescribed form before a Firearm Acquisition Certificate can be issued.
A much greater potential for regional inconsistencies lies not with
government but the courts. Some proceedings challenging decisions made
with respect to the various applications involve the federal government
directly and are heard by the Federal Court of Canada.89 Challenges to
firearm seizures or forfeitures and criminal prosecutions, however. Many
of these cases require judicial determinations that a particular item is a
"weapon", "firearm", "restricted weapon", or "prohibited weapon" as
defined by the Criminal Code or the determination of criminal charges.
In such cases, the Code vests jurisdiction in provincial criminal and
appellate courts. In these cases, a Canada-wide precedent is not set until
a particular issue reaches the Supreme Court of Canada, a process which
may take several years. Many of these challenges require judicial
determinations that a particular item is a "weapon", "firearm", "restricted
weapon" or "prohibited weapon," as defined by the Criminal Code, or the
determination of criminal charges. In such cases, the Code vests
jurisdiction in provincial criminal and appellate courts. In these cases, a
Canada-wide precedent is not set until a particular issue reaches the
Supreme Court of Canada, a process which may take several years. The
recent litigation concerning the status of converted automatic firearms is
an example of what can occur. After the Alberta Court of Appeal held
that a very high standard of conversion was required,' the Ontario Court
of Appeal held that a much lower standard applied.9' The conflicting rules
in the two provinces set inconsistent standards and led to uncertainty in
the rest of Canada, until the matter was resolved by the Supreme Court.
92
At the local level, the legislation is administered by police agencies
and officers, who for the most part, are strong supporters of strict gun
control particularly at the more senior levels. 93 Police agencies also tend
89. Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, §§ 17-18 (1985) (Can.).
90. R. v. Global Armaments Ltd. (1990), 105 A.R. 260 (Aia. C.A.) (holding that
automatic firearms were prohibited weapons retained unless the conversion was
"essentially irreversible.").
91. R. v. Hasselwander (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 426, 5 O.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.).
92. R.v. Hasselwander, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 398, 40 C.R. (4th) 277, 81 C.C.C. (3d) 471.
The problem of inconsistent case law from one province to the next is, of course, by no
means limited to firearm-related issues.
93. The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police supported the 1991 amendments.
See Legislative Committee H, supra note 64, at 5:5-24 (1 Dec. 1991). The police
community has also expressed support for proposals to make further changes in 1995. See
1995]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
to resist inconsistencies or interpretations which may differ from one part
of the country to another.94 Some police officers have expressed
opposition to strict gun control policies. However, what structural or
institutional resistance exists in the police community appears to result
more from concerns about the administrative demands placed on personnel
and resources than from any fundamental policy concerns.
Police officers may in some cases see the processing of firearms
applications as a low priority in comparison with other police functions,
but most officers appear to be sympathetic to the overall policy that no one
should have access to a firearm without first being screened. The result
is the exact opposite of what occurs in the United States. Under the U.S.
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, for example, police failure to
block a handgun purchase results in automatic approval. Canadian
legislation, on the other hand, completely blocks access to any handgun
unless police approval is given and the handgun is registered, regardless
of how long the process takes, or why it is delayed.
IV. CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES
As suggested above, the law neither leads nor follows national
culture. In any democratic society, however, the law is profoundly
influenced by public opinion and the efforts of those who lobby
governments to enact legislation reflecting their views or preferences,
particularly if these are fairly consistent over long periods of time. In
Canada, public opinion consistently supports strict gun control
legislation,95 and to some extent, rejects the ownership or use of firearms
Tougher Gun Laws Sought by Metro [Toronto] Police Board, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 8, 1994,
at A6; Police Chief [of Edmonton, Alberta] Seeks Ban on Handguns, EDMONTON J., Aug.
24, 1994, at B1. The federal Justice Minister spoke to the annual meeting of the Canadian
Association of Chiefs of Police about firearms control proposals on August 25, 1994.
Campbell Clark, I'll Toughen Gun Control- Minister; Police Hail Pledge, MONTREAL
GAZE'rE, Aug. 26, 1994, at Al.
94. See the remarks of Mr. Tom Flanagan, speaking on behalf of the Canadian
Association of Chiefs of Police, Special Committee on Bill C-80, supra note 9, at 7:16-17
(19 Dec. 1990).
95. See Friedland, supra note 1, at 245. Since 1990, support for stricter legislation
has ranged from about 50-80%, depending upon region and the specific issues raised by
pollsters. In April of 1990, four months after the 1989 University of Montreal shootings,
an Environics poll found that 52 % of Canadians favoured banning the sale and possession
of all firearms, while only 44% opposed the idea. Support was highest in central Canada
(Quebec and Ontario) and lowest in the western provinces. Support for controls on
semiautomatic firearms was much higher. One poll found 92% support for this in Quebec
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as weapons. Allowing for some structural differences between the
Canadian and American political systems, the nature of the pressures
brought to bear and the tactics used would appear to be fairly similar.
The relative strengths of the two fundamental positions with respect to gun
control and the outcome of the process, are quite different in Canada.
Many of the cultural and historical differences have been raised
before.96 The different histories, legal and constitutional frameworks,
racial and cultural heritages and other factors affect attitudes toward
firearms. The portrayal of crime in the media is also probably a factor,
although one which acts more or less equally on anglophone Canada and
the United States, which both share many of the same television and print
media.' One economist, examining American gun control, stated the
problem in terms of supply and demand.
The purpose of [gun control] laws would be both to restrict the
supply and to put that supply, from the production line onwards,
in more responsible and accountable hands. Yet guns, it is said,
cannot be treated this way. Demand for guns is huge and, at
present, insensitive to price. Supply cannot be held down until
demand is checked, too-until, that is, Americans begin to
believe that they do not need guns to protect themselves.98
Also of great influence on the attitudes and opinions of Canadians
towards firearms and gun control, is the very existence of the United
States and the position of its politicians and citizens. The perceived effect
may vary according to one's own support or opposition to gun control, but
at about the same time (lUger et Lger, Journal de Montreal, Feb. 17, 1990, at 4). More
recently, an Angus Reid poll (May 2, 1994) found that 73 % of Canadians favoured the
prohibition of privately-owned handguns. The results of an Environics survey (October
1994) were consistent with this: 90% favoured registering all firearms, 67% favoured
banning the private ownership of handguns, and 75% wanted controls on ammunition
sales. An Angus Reid poll taken at the same time found that about 70 % of those surveyed
favoured stricter controls generally.
96. Friedland, supra note 1 at 240-47. See infra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
97. Canadian pollsters routinely indicate that Quebec, which does not share those
media to the same extent, often exhibits different opinions on a number of social issues.
Support for strict gun control tends to be higher in Quebec than in any other province, a
phenomenon which may also be attributable, in part, to the fact that the 1989 mass-
shooting incident took place in Quebec. Quebecers Turn in Fewer Firearms; Ontario
Residents Hand Over Six imes More Weapons, MoNTREAL GAzT-rE, Dec. 17, 1992, at A5;
see also polls supra note 94.
98. Land of the Free, supra note 6, at 15-16.
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it exists either way. The availability and demand for firearms in the
United States triggers wistful envy on the part of some Canadian firearm
owners, particularly those who subscribe to American beliefs about the
right to bear arms and the ownership of guns for personal and self-
defence. American examples where firearms are alleged to have been
successful in deterring or preventing crime are sometimes cited in the
public, debate in Canada. 99
The reaction of the majority of Canadians, who support gun control
policies, is quite different. Canadians and the media tend to emphasize,
if not exaggerate, both American crime rates and the role played by
firearms in producing those rates. A recurring theme in recent Canadian
public debate has been the use of U.S. shooting incidents by gun control
advocates as an example of what could happen in Canada if Canadian laws
were not maintained. Meanwhile, gun control opponents scramble to
develop theories which explain higher U.S. crime and shooting rates which
do not involve high rates of firearm ownership.1° The resistance of
Canadians to the use of firearms as weapons, whether for personal defence
or civil defence, has also weakened the arguments of gun control
opponents by dividing them into a number of factions. While the National
Rifle Association has been described as one of the most effective lobbying
organizations in the United States, there is no single parallel Canadian
organization. During legislative deliberations over proposed gun control
amendments in 1990-91, fourteen major groups appeared on behalf of
firearms interests. There was much common ground between them, but
there were also substantial differences, particularly those based on the
various types of firearms and the uses to which they could or should be
put. °0 At the same time, legislators and members of the public tended to
view the various representatives collectively, leaving the more moderate
interests and groups tarnished by the views of their more radical
counterparts.
Any suggestion that U.S. organizations were intentionally intervening
in the Canadian debate would be seen as outside interference, 0 2 but
99. Legislative Committee H, supra note 64, at 5:32-33 (1 Oct. 1991).
100. Id. at 5: 33 (1 Oct. 1991); Special Committee on Bill C-80, supra note 9, at 3:67-
68 (13 Dec. 1990).
101. Report of the Special Committee on the Subject-Matter of Bill C-80 (Firearms),
Parliament of Canada, 1991, App. "A". Major firearms groups included the Shooting
Federation of Canada, the Dominion of Canada Rifle Association and I.P.S.C. Canada
(target-shooting), as well as organizations representing collectors, hunters, and commercial
interests. Id.
102. This makes interest groups in Canada unwilling to acknowledge any direct
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Canadian firearms interest groups commonly employ the same arguments
and in some cases, the same tactics as those used by their American
counterparts. The National Rifle Association has, in at least one case,
funded research in Canada, 10 3 but the American gun lobby probably exerts
far more influence in the form of publications and advertisements than any
type of direct intervention. Many individual Canadian firearm owners are
either members of the NRA or subscribe to its publications, and American
firearms magazines and other periodicals containing advertising and
editorial content opposing gun control and extolling the virtues of the
Second Amendment are freely available on Canadian news stands. It is
also likely that the marketing of firearms for recreational and other
purposes and the indirect but extensive placement of firearms in
magazines, television, motion picture and other media originating from the
United States have an impact on attitudes and the demand for firearms in
Canada. 104
On the other side, the general popular support for gun control and the
aftermath of the University of Montreal murders has served as a unifying
force. Between the time of the murders, in December of 1989, and the
passage of the 1991 Criminal Code amendments exactly two years later,
gun control advocates formed a single group, the Coalition for Gun
Control which combined the police community, religious groups, public
health and medical groups and some victims groups. Some of the
precursors of the coalition were sponsors of the 1990-91 petition, and the
coalition, once it was set up, vigorously lobbied Members of Parliament
while the 1991 Criminal Code ammendments were before the legislature.
It continues to play a similar role to the present day.
There is also overlapping and comparative academic research linking
Canada and the United States, particularly in medical and public-health
linkages with similar U.S. groups, and their opponents eager to try to establish such links.
See Special Committee on Bill C-80, supra note 9, at 3: 89-90 (13 Dec. 1990).
103. Gary A. Mauser, A Comparison of Canadian and American Attitudes Towards
Firearms, 32 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 573, 588 n.1. (1990).
104. Firearm advertising in Canada is not limited to American firms. Manufacturers
from other countries and Canadian wholesale and retail firms also advertise. There is
almost no manufacturing of firearms in Canada, however, and many Canadian interests
rely at least partly on brochures and other material furnished by manufacturers. Federal
regulations bar the use of violence in firearm-related advertising, but do not otherwise
limit what may be advertised or how. See Restricted Weapons and Firearms Control
Regulations, SOR/78-670. This has not been interpreted as restricting the advertising of
firearms for home or self-defence, and such content routinely appears in U.S.-based
magazines sold in Canada.
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literature most of which tends to support arguments for strict gun
control.1 05 The medical community in Canada has become increasingly
active in support of strict legislation, probably following the lead of many
American physicians and academics who have written and spoken on the
subject. As a major cause of death and injury in the United States,
firearms have long attracted the attention of doctors, who have advocated
Testrictions on availability as a means of preventioim. 1°6  The Canadian
Medical Association and many of its members have adopted a similar
position since the University of Montreal shooting incident. 1
07
V. THE PRESENT DAY: THE PROPOSED
1995 AMENDMENTS
The 1993 federal election radically altered the Canadian political
landscape, reducing the former Progressive Conservative government to
only two seats in the House of Commons. The same election gave the
new Liberal government a substantial majority, and created significant
minorities for the right-wing Reform Party and the separatist Bloc
Qu~becois. Of the parties now represented, only the Reform Party
opposes stricter gun control legislation, 08 although some individual
Government (Liberal) Members have also expressed reservations."09 There
is also opposition to some of the proposals from provincial politicians in
some parts of Canada. 10
105. See, e.g., Sproule & Kennett, supra note 1; Sloan et al., supra note 1; John H.
Sloan et al., Firearms Regulations & Rates of Suicide: A Comparison of Two
Metropolitian Areas, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 369 (1990).
106. SusanP. Baker, Firearms and the Public Health, 1 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 224,228
(1980).
107. Trent, supra note 28. See also Chapdelaine & Kimberley, Firearm-Related
Injuries in Canada: Issues for Prevention, 145 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1217 (1991). Messrs.
Chapdelaine and Kimberley also served on the Canadian Advisory Council on Firearms
which was set up to provide policy advice to the Minister of Justice on gun control issues.
108. During 1994, at least one prominent opponent of firearms legislation was elected
as a Reform Party riding president, and editorials in a Canadian firearms publication have
been supportive of the Party. Party members passed a resolution calling for the repeal of
all gun control legislation passed since the 1976-77 amendments during the summer of
1994, although it is not clear whether this is official party policy.
109. Every Gun Will Be Registered [Prime Minister] Chretien Vows, ToRONTo ST&R, Ot.
22, 1994, Al. A small group of government members also appeared at a rally opposing
further gun control amendments (which the author attended) in Ottawa during August of
1994.
110. Gun Registry Won't Reduce Crime, Says New [Provincial] Minister, EDMONTON
SUN, Oct. 22, 1994, at N2.
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Some gun control opponents have argued that the enactment of the
1991 amendments led to the 1993 election defeat of the former
Conservative government which developed them. Gun control may have
affected voters in a few ridings, but it is a minor issue in comparison with
the other political and economic factors raised during the campaign. To
the extent that gun control did play a role, moreover, it may have been
more significant in electing candidates who support gun control, than in
defeating those who opposed it. The position of the victorious Liberal
Party favouring even stricter legislation was made clear during the debates
surrounding the 1991 changes and was well known to interest groups on
both sides of the issue. It was raised in the Liberal campaign as part of
a general crime control package, but was not made a major issue.
The Reform Party opposed gun control as part of a more general
attack on government regulation, a position which proved popular in some
western and northern ridings, but not in large urban centres or the east. 11"'
The votes of firearms enthusiasts may actually have backfired in some
ridings, where a split of the right-wing vote between the Conservative and
Reform Parties allowed Liberal candidates to win by default. On the
whole, however, whether the gun control issue played into the hands of
supporters or opponents, it is unlikely to have played a decisive role either
way.
The new government has since moved to deliver On its promises.
Following preliminary indications that further gun control legislation might
be pending,"' lobbying activity has also increased, particularly for
firearms enthusiasts, who staged a series of public rallies opposing more
restrictive legislation during the spring and summer of 1994. On
November 30, 1994, a package of legislative and other proposals was
announced by the Minister of Justice, who indicated that the necessary
legislation would be placed before Parliament early in 1995.13
111. The Reform Party took seats from the Conservative Party in Manitoba, and
Alberta, and from the socialist New Democratic Party in northern British Columbia. It
won only one seat in Ontario, in a largely rural riding, and no seats in Quebec or the
Atlantic provinces. See Charles Trueheart, Canada's Voters Awake to New Political
Order, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1993, at Al.
112. Both the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister made a number of comments
in the legislature and to the media suggesting that measures ranging from the registration
of all firearms to the prohibition of all handguns were under consideration. Those two
proposals in particular received extensive media coverage. Every Gun Will be Registered
[Prime Minister] Chretien Vows, supra note 109, at Al.
113. ACMION PLAN, supra note 2, tabled in the House of Commons, Nov. 30,1994. See
also David Vienneau, Ottawa to Ban Deadly Firearms, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 1, 1994, at
Al; Stephen Bindman & Doug Fischer, Gun Owners Get 8 Years to Register, OrrOWA
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The Action Plan, tabled in the House of Commons, makes it clear that
the changes will continue the fundamental policies pursued by earlier
governments with respect to deterrence, incapacitation, screening and
firepower or firearm-specific controls. The major changes announced
included the prohibition of most semiautomatic variants of assault rifles,
which had been restricted in the 1991 changes, and the prohibition of non-
sporting handguns, 114 both with the proviso that those already in possession
could keep the firearms, but not transfer them to new owners.' The
proposals also include increases in the mandatory sentences for using a
firearm to commit an offence, increases in the scope and application of
court prohibition orders, and setting up a system to register and track all
firearms in Canada. 116 Given the strong majority of the government in the
House of Commons, it is likely that these proposals will become law
sometime in 1995, although full implementation will take longer than
that. 117
VI. FUTURE IMPACT OF THE U.S. ON CANADIAN POLICY
The differences in legislation, policy and public attitudes with respect
to firearms between Canada and the United States will no doubt continue
to raise Canadian concerns. These may become more acute in an era of
freer international trade and. more open borders with respect to
CITIZEN, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al; Gun Plan Final, [Minister of Justice] Rock Declares, GLOBE
& MAIL, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al. The legislation was introduced by the Minister of Justice
on February 14, 1995 and is presently before the Canadian House of Commons as Bill C-
68.
114. Handguns with barrels shorter than 4.14 inches (105mm) or non-sporting calibres
(.25 or .32 calibre) were prohibited. Total Gun Registration, Broad Bans Proposed,
BERGEN REC., Feb. 15, 1995, at A18.
115. This follows the precedent of earlier "grandfather" clauses used in the 1976-77
and 1991 changes, but is more restrictive. The earlier provisions created closed classes
of pre-existing owners, who could transfer the firearms within the classes. The proposed
1995 change allows continued possession, but no future transfers of any kind. Can. Dep't
of Justice, News Release, Nov. 30, 1994, at 2.
116. The initial setting up of the registration system will be a large undertaking. The
exact number of non-restricted firearms in Canada is not known, but is estimated at
between 6 and 7 million, in addition to the 1.2 million restricted firearms already
registered under the 1969 and earlier requirements. The system is also expected to handle
about 500,000 transactions (imports, exports, transfers etc.) per year once in place. See
ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 13-14.
117. Gun Owners Get 8 Years to Register, OrAwA CrZEN, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al.
This is slightly misleading, since the proposal would actually have completed the last
registration by the end of the seven to eight year period.
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commodities other than firearms. One of the justifications given for the
1995 proposal to register all firearms was the need to control the "theft,
diversion and smuggling" of firearms into Canada. The 1994 Action Plan
points out that
Canada's relatively strict legislation and the easier availability of
firearms in the United States raise concerns about smuggling, and
past Parliamentary committees and the Auditor General of
Canada have both recommended legislative and administrative
controls." 8
Smuggling is almost certainly a significant problem for Canada,
although it is difficult to quantify because of the illegal and covert nature
of the activities involved. The problem is also complex, potentially
ranging from large-scale international small-arms trafficking passing
through Canada, to smaller-scale operations in which firearms are
smuggled across the border for illegal resale or personal use." 9 Customs
personnel have indicated that many import offenses are committed by
visiting Americans who bring personal firearms across the border out of
ignorance or disrespect for Canadian law.' 20
Recommendations that steps be taken both to quantify the problem of
smuggling and to control it figured prominently in the debates surrounding
the 1991 amendments and subsequent recommendations, 2 and have since
become a major focus of the 1995 initiative.' The urgency of the
problem is probably exaggerated somewhat by the fact that attacks on
smuggling appeal to both sides of a very polarized debate, albeit for
118. AcTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 11.
119. All of these activities are criminal offenses in Canada unless the proper permits
are obtained. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 40, § 97(3) (1991) (Can.). Under this
provision, any acquisition of a firearm without an Acquisition Certificate (FAC) (or in the
case of a commercial acquisitions, a business permit) is an offence, and importation is
included as a form of acquisition. Private non-resident importers, such as visiting hunters
are exempted from this requirement by § 97(4)(c).
120. Special Committee on Bill C-80, supra note 9, at 10:9-10 (15 Jan. 1991).
121. See Report of the Special Committee on the Subject-Matter of Bill C-80 (Firearms)
(House of Commons, February 1991) at 42-43. See also Tenth Report of the Standing
Committee on Justice and the Solicitor-General ("Consideration of the draft regulations
on gun control tabled in the House by the Minister of Justice on Tuesday, March 31,
1992") (House of Commons, June 1992) at 33.
122. See Heat on Firearms at Border: [Minister of Justice] Rock Vows Smuggling
Crackdown, WINNIPEG FREE PREss, June 9, 1994, at A3; Smugglers Swell Gun Numbers,
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 22, 1994, at A15. See also ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 11-13.
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different reasons. Gun control opponents argue that legal owners are not
part of the crime problem and urge the government to pursue anti-
smuggling legislation and programs instead of more general restrictions on
access or possession which affect their interests directly. Those who
support strict legislation tend to agree that illegal importation must be
addressed as part of the problem, but do not accept the "either-or"
arguments of their opponents. They support smuggling controls, but only
in addition to strict domestic controls.
Further attention may have been focused on smuggling by the decision
of the Canadian government, early in its mandate, to reduce domestic
tobacco taxes as a way of controlling tobacco smuggling. Alcohol
producers subsequently asked for the same treatment, and the policy could
be seen as a precedent for easing domestic firearm restrictions as well.
As with other smuggling problems such as alcohol, tobacco, and
narcotics,1 23 firearm smuggling will be difficult to control as long as the
Canada-U.S. border remains open and there are significant legislative
discrepancies between the two jurisdictions. The Canadian Government
has indicated that it will intensify enforcement efforts, but some smuggling
will probably always be present as long as firearms are easier to obtain in
the U.S. than in Canada, a fact which may eventually lead Canadians and
their media to become critical of U.S. domestic policy and legislation.
This trend could well become more pronounced if media crime reporting
begins to focus on the origins of smuggled guns used in actual offenses in
Canada. 124
Less direct in its impact on public opinion, but no less significant than
smuggling is the general fear of crime and the fear that the perceived
higher levels of crime in the United States will be imported into Canada
with American firearms and cultural attitudes towards firearms. Crime
rates in the United States are seen as being linked to firearm ownership
and availability and the public reaction is often that if availability is
reduced, the crime problems can be avoided. In the words of a former
Minister of Justice:
123. Concerns about the smuggling of weapons are linked to other smuggling activities,
often because weapons kept for protection or smuggled as a sideline are seized from those
whose primary activities involve other commodities. Following the 1992-93 crackdown
on tobacco smuggling and tax-cut on tobacco, police also expressed concerns that those
involved would maintain their operations by switching from tobacco to firearms. Guns
Replace Cig Smuggling, OTTAWA SUN, Aug. 28, 1994, at A5.
124. The proposed 1995 changes may actually make this more likely, both by further
limiting the access of criminals to non-smuggled guns and by making it possible, as guns
are registered, for police and the media to determine their immediate origins once seized.
310 [Vol. 15
CANADIAN GUN CONTROL
Canadians have seen the extent of the problem of uncontrolled
firearms in the United States and there is the fear that the same
situation could arise in Canada if effective controls are not
maintained .. .. Comparisons are difficult, but it is common
knowledge that Canada enjoys a much lower rate of firearms
incidents than the United States, and I believe that this is at least
partly due to the stricter gun control regime here.
125
VII. CONCLUSION
The existence and proximity of the United States has had a
pronounced effect on the public debate concerning gun control policies in
Canada for as long as the debate has existed. The effect differs from one
side to the other, but it clearly affects both sides. The influence on gun
control opponents in Canada is most easily seen, although it may be
ultimately the less significant in terms of its impact on policy-makers and
the law.
The effect of American phenomena on advocates for stricter gun
controls is less obvious, but probably more significant in its impact in
Canada. The U.S. gun control lobby, having had relatively little success
at home, exerts little influence in Canada, but none has been needed.
There is an element of cultural resistance to American values in Canada
which causes many of the arguments of gun control opponents, particularly
those based on self-protection, to trigger more or less the opposite reaction
to what those arguments generally produce in the U.S. Where the
arguments of gun control opponents have tended to mimic American
positions, the arguments of gun control supporters have often responded
by holding up the United States as an unpleasant example of what could
happen in Canada if strict controls are not adopted.
A spokesperson for the leading Canadian gun control advocate, the
Coalition for Gun Control, recently responded to claims about the need for
self-protection by observing that if firearm ownership for self-protection
actually worked, the United States' high ownership rates would make it the
safest country in the world.126 A similar argument has been made by the
present Government in support of the proposed 1995 amendments.
125. Special Committee on Bill C-80, supra note 9, at 3:36-37 (13 Dec. 1990) (Hon.
A. Kim Campbell).
126. Ms. Wendy Cukier, at a seminar at Queens' University, Kingston, Ontario, on
December 6, 1993 (unpublished).
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Canadians do not want to live in a society where they feel they
need to own a gun for protection. We value living in a safe and
peaceful society, a society that shuns crime and violence.
127
The overall effect of American influence on both sides of the
Canadian debate is that the arguments of gun control opponents in Canada
often play into the hands of its supporters. Arguments which in the
United States play to the fears of potential firearm customers that
remaining unarmed will leave them vulnerable to crime, here play to the
fears of many Canadians that, without gun control programs, the U.S.
crime phenomena might spread north. The success of such arguments in
Canada can be attributed partly to the fact that crime and firearm-related
mortality really are higher in the U.S. than in Canada. The effect is
probably because most Canadians no doubt believe that crime in the
United States is far worse than it actually is, and are frequently subjected
to fictional and non-fictional media reports that tend to confirm their worst
fears.
The very different histories, social and political cultures of Canada
and the United States have played a significant role in determining gun
control policies. These factors have been stable in their existence and
influence for a very long time, and are not likely to change in the
foreseeable future, with the possible exception of some erosion of the
more hard-line positions favouring firearm ownership in the United States.
The social and cultural differences and the close links between Canada and
the United States are such that it would be surprising if each did not exert
some influence on the other. The American influences on Canada
described in this paper can perhaps be more clearly seen because of the
relative sizes of the two countries, but reciprocal influences are also likely
to exist.
The reactions of American politicians, voters and interest groups to
developments in Canada have been limited thus far, although this could
change if Canada's legislation is seen as setting a precedent for the United
States and one or both sides in the American debate hold up specific
Canadian policies in an attempt to motivate their supporters. As with
every argument in this controversial debate, the Canadian reaction to such
a turn of events would be mixed. The majority of Canadians regard this
country's restrictive policies and legislation as reasonable and entirely
warranted, and would probably find it rather ironic if their chosen policies
127. Allan M. Rock, Minister of Justice, quoted in News Release, Canada Department
of Justice, November 30, 1994.
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were used as a scare tactic by American lobby groups.

